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ABSTRACT 
 
Study on power structures and their influences on the patterns of interaction used in the military is a rare 
phenomenon due to strong gatekeeping. Many past researchers have delved only into military culture and 
organisational communication. The aim of this paper is to present findings of this research gap i.e., on the 
patterns of interaction used by both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel in the Malaysian Army. It 
discusses how power structures influence the patterns of interaction used by them. The study investigates how 
rank structure and chain of command in the military (legitimised authority) influence both commissioned 
officers and enlisted personnel in deriving their patterns of interaction. It also investigates how the dominant 
ideology and organisational culture (hegemony) derive their patterns of interaction. This study analyses the 
transcripts of three audio recordings among commissioned officers and enlisted personnel which were audio 
recorded from a meet up, meeting and drill training session. The findings indicate that members of the 
Malaysian Army derive their patterns of interaction through different means. Those different means are not just 
through coercive means contrary to popular belief but also through regulatory and subtle means. Those 
different means are determined by the context and speakers. The findings reveal that command and control are 
essentially linked to many contributing factor and not just merely power per se.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The notions of command, control, power and authority are all synonymous to the customs 
and traditions of the military. It is highly regarded as a well-trained organisation and ever 
ready in response to any acts of war or even in non-combat situations which require military 
intervention. However, most of the general population will have their own preconceived idea 
of the military from movies, dramas, books and news (Kantor, 2016). The military culture 
encompasses the values, norms, traditions and the set of beliefs that differentiates the military 
from other organisations (Lee, 2003). Due to the existing lack of understanding on the 
military culture, not many people who are civilians in the general population understand how 
and why members of the military behave in their own unique way (Redmond et al., 2015). 
The society at large will often have that preconditioned, surface level mentality of the 
military taking on the predominant form of power; institutionalised with a governed set of 
rules and conceptualised with a necessity of order (Hobbes, 1962). One will consider less on 
the concealed approach of power which is subdued, setting a certain set of beliefs or ideology 
within an organisation like the military through power by politics (Machiavelli, 1958) which 
is very much hegemonic in nature. 
 The organisational structure of the military can be clearly seen on the badges of rank 
for their members. Those rank insignias on all commissioned officers and enlisted personnel 
define the ever existing rank structure in the military. Luckwaldt (2017) explains that in the 
course of history, commissioned officers originated from noble aristocrats or landowners who 
receive commissions from a monarch. Those commissions granted them the rights to train 
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soldiers, in which the enlisted ones were made up of the commoners whom the commissioned 
officers led into battle. In today’s modern military, the privileges of commissioned officers 
during those aristocratic eras are maintained in the level of authority granted to 
commissioned officers as the vested source of command in a military unit. 
 His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the Supreme Commander of the Malaysian 
Armed Forces (MAF, hereafter); bestowed with the rank of a Field Marshal (Reid, 1957). 
Any commissioned officer of the MAF is acting in the name of His Majesty to the unit and 
men under his command. Therefore, all commissioned officers of the MAF are bestowed 
with His Majesty’s Royal Commission and their names are published in the Government’s 
Gazette which embodies the officers’ corps with a brotherhood of shared prestige and elite 
status (Armed Forces Act, 1972). With such prestigious authority, commissioned officers act 
as managers to enlisted personnel. The contrasting factor between commissioned officers and 
enlisted personnel lies in their level of authority in which commissioned officers embody in 
the prestige to lead, mirroring senior management roles in the corporate world (Luckwaldt, 
2017). Enlisted personnel in the MAF comprise of the backbone and workforce of the 
services. 
 With the distinct hierarchical structure, the military has a very clear chain of 
command. Each member of the military will have to report to a specific individual who is in 
command; addressing issues and accepting orders. Therefore, there are very unique patterns 
of interaction among commissioned officers and enlisted personnel which revolve around 
power structures and hierarchy. Thus, the military as a community has its own peculiar way 
of depicting interaction which indicates its hierarchical structure and values (Azlina Abdul 
Aziz, 2017). In view of the above reasons, there is a need to address existing gaps of 
knowledge in understanding how the power structures; which are legitimately enforced and 
subtly practiced in the military influence the patterns of interaction used by its members. The 
objectives of this paper are to highlight the patterns of interaction used by commissioned 
officers and enlisted personnel in the military; with specific reference to the Malaysian Army 
and to address how the power structures influence the patterns of interaction used in the 
Malaysian Army. The patterns of interaction and the power structures unravelled the methods 
used by people in power and those subjected to power during their routine interactions which 
involved decision making, enforcement of obedience and influencing others. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON POWER RELATIONS 
 
It was also found that many past studies indicated that language used in organisations enacted 
power relationships through the maintenance of identities, fulfilment of needs and 
achievement of needs (Talbot, Atkinson & Atkinson, 2003; Suhaili, Ahmad & Aminah, 
2015). However, we know very little about the differences in the patterns of interaction used 
by commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.  
 Those past studies which were conducted are namely; the factors influencing the 
success of the military’s process improvement teams by Nuppenau (1993), change and 
continuity of military culture by Dunivin (1994), military perspectives of organisations and 
their effects on organisational culture by Winsor (1996). Some other studies on military 
cultures were conducted on the social and environmental influences on change in the 
military’s organisational culture by Breslin (2000), need to change US Army culture by Ault 
(2003), trends in the US military culture by Watson (2006), defining the military culture as 
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specific form of institutional culture by Wilson (2008) and the transfer of military culture to 
private sector organisations by Tinoko and Arnaud (2013). 
 Apart from that, other past studies were conducted on the aspects of power which 
focused on other concepts such as the organisation structure and communication by Hage, 
Aiken and Marrett (1971), organisational communication by Goldhaber (1990) and 
Johansson (2007), a research conducted on the basis of power effects on method of 
communication with specific reference to project management by Tran (2007) and 
clarification of the loopholes between politeness and power by Althuwaimer and Alqahtani 
(2016). Nonetheless, those analyses did not represent the military as an institutionalised 
setting. 
 In the body of research, past studies were not focused on the power structures in the 
military and their influence towards the patterns of interaction on its members. Instead, they 
were conducted on the aspects military culture within the military and by military 
sociologists; therefore receiving minimal attention outside these disciplines of research 
despite its relevance beyond the military setting (Tinoko & Arnaud, 2013). 
 Subsequently, there were challenges in obtaining genuine data from informants in the 
military since many researchers are not in the military and that very hindrance often limited 
the drive of research in this area. A study like this will shed some light on how dominant 
groups in the higher echelon of the military derive their patterns of interaction used based on 
the power structures. Discourse analysts can also gain a better understanding in critical 
factors influencing communication within the military setting in contrast to what other 
researchers discovered in other civilian organisations which are less hierarchal and rank 
based like the military. The conceptions of power being practised and exercised in the 
military can be differentiated between Hobbes and Machiavelli’s traditions of power (Clegg, 
1989). 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF POWER 
 
The roots of power can be viewed through two different streams of conceptions which were 
proposed by Hobbes (1962) and Machiavelli (1958). There is a major difference between 
Hobbes and Machiavelli’s conceptions of power in which the former conceptualised the 
concept of sovereignty and community whereas the latter defined power metaphorically with 
strategy and organisation. The continuity of the former was also expressed by Foucault 
(1981) that power is formulated based on sovereignty and power acts as the locus of will; in 
which other wills will bend. It can be said that the subjected ones towards power’s 
sovereignty are not able to recognise their own wills as their own wills are being captured by 
the sovereign power of another individual (Clegg 1989). It is often viewed that Hobbes and 
his supporting theorists legislated and outlined the description of power and in contrast; 
Machiavelli and his supporting theorists interpreted the effects of power. Machiavelli 
contrasted Hobbes’ work through the removal of the legislator’s role and interpreted the 
strategies of power in organisations viewed through the lenses of politics which are 
ideologically driven through hegemony. 
 Institutionalised power is a form of legitimate power which is drawn from the position 
or rank of an individual within the social context and the rights of the individual to request 
and demand compliance from subordinates (Hobbes, 1962; Tran, 2007). This notion of 
legitimate power is formal in nature and is rightfully delegated to the holder of the position 
(Hughes, Ginnett & Curphy, 2006). Legitimisation encompasses the process of justification 
and sanctioning an act or power on the basis of conforming to norms (Abduljalil, Noraini 
Ibrahim & Nor Fariza Mohd Nor, 2014). As in the context of the military, commissioned 
officers hold the institutionalised status. This contributes to the wielding of legitimate power 
3L: The Southeast Asian Journal of English Language Studies – Vol 25(3): 46 – 64 
http://doi.org/10.17576/3L-2019-2503-04 
49 
	  
which is seen through the submission of enlisted personnel who are subordinates. Besides 
that, the institutionalised status of power in the military is also coercive in nature; as the 
institutionalised power holder has the legal rights to strictly monitor and punish those 
subordinates who do not conform to the requirements and norms set by the military 
(Hofmann et al., 2017). Tran (2007) proposed that the coercive nature of institutionalised 
power enforces obedience from subordinates; thus, legitimising and allowing commissioned 
officers to punish and withhold rewards. 
 Lukes (1974) placed forth that the ultimate exercise of power is to ensure that an 
individual or other individuals get things done based on one’s will and secure their obedience 
through the control of their thoughts and desires.	  Besides institutionalised power, the roots of 
the power structure within the military are also associated with the abstract process of power 
wielding which is very much linked to hegemony. Gramsci (1971) clearly defined the theory 
of hegemony which is often termed as ideological dominance in which dominated groups 
accept a dominant ideology as a norm. Hence, hegemony at its greatest form of manipulation 
influences the way the subjected people under the hierarchical structure behave, talk, react or 
even limit their actions based on the set of norms being set by those who hold power and 
position. Those who hold power do not only centralise the levels of authority but also seek 
relationship with the subjected ones (Mohd Muzhafar Idrus & Nor Fariza Mohd Nor, 2016). 
 Gramsci proposed that a dominant class and a subordinate class exist in a social 
setting known as alta cultura (the culture of the ruling groups) and cultura popolare (the 
culture of the subaltern masses); universalising the ideology and practices of the ruling group 
(Merrington 1969). Fontana (1993) explained Machiavelli’s thoughts that coercion is not 
enough for the attainment and maintenance of power. In the renown writing by Machiavelli 
(1958) entitled The Prince, he clearly stated his grounds in Chapter 18 in which he 
represented the balance of the two concepts of politics through force (dominio) and consent 
(direzione). He described that a prince (dominant class) must know how to utilise both force 
and consent and one without the other is not enough. Fontana extended Machiavelli’s 
thoughts that coercive power which is being institutionalised cannot achieve an everlasting 
rule over the dominated ones but the dominant one needs to exercise intellectual and moral 
leadership with consent and persuasion; similar to Gramsci’s hegemonic power.  
 Machiavelli’s conceptions of power reciprocate the relationship of a prince (dominant 
class) who needs the support and active consent of the people. If he fails to do so, the prince 
just becomes a mere feudal lord. Machiavelli and Gramsci’s thoughts divide the society into 
two different spheres (two civitas); the first an aristocrat (dominant class) who possesses 
knowledge and the subjected ones (subordinate class) being the majority in the social class 
who cannot reach the level of the upper class due to the unavoidable subordination of the 
latter to a culturally dominant class (Fontana 1993). Similarly, the highly structured set of 
beliefs which are driven ideologically in the military has been viewed as unique as 
commissioned officers have a special responsibility for leadership. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY 
 
Goldhaber (1990) proposed that organisational communication is the life-blood of the 
organisation and research found that the value of organisational communication can be seen 
in effective communication which produces the high output in the organisation. Within the 
military itself, the perception of organisational communication is often viewed as conveying 
and receiving of information on the interdependent system of internal communication which 
includes downward, upward and horizontal communication, similar to other organisations 
(Redding & Sanborn, 1964; Zelko & Dance, 1965). 
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 Hence, both the institutionalised status of authority and ideology driven in the military 
set the environment; for commissioned officers who are typically superiors over their 
subordinates to utilise downward communication as a measure of command, giving out 
orders and setting disciplinary guidelines to their subordinates. The reversed order for 
enlisted soldiers entails an upward communication process with reconfirmation on the orders 
given, providing feedback at their level of being subordinates to superiors. Lateral 
communication occurs at the same level of the rank structure with methods to solve 
problems, for coordination and unofficial matters. Hence, those contexts influence the 
communicative behaviour of members of the military and as communicants, they are vital in 
the process of information dissemination (Arina Anis Azlan & Samsudin A. Rahim, 2017). 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Khoo (2019) 
 
FIGURE 1. Conceptual Framework of Research 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the research investigated how the power structures in the 
military influence the patterns of interaction used by its members which draw on the two 
conceptions of power known as institutionalised power (Hobbes, 1962) and power by politics 
(Machiavelli, 1958). The researcher conceptualised that the socially controlled environment 
in the military is formed by those who wield power. It is governed by certain legitimised 
authority (Armed Forces Act, 1972) through institutionalised power and also through the 
subtle yet abstract process of hegemonic power application (Gramsci, 1971).  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
DESCRIPTION OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
This qualitative research was conducted at one of the training centres which annually 
conducts career and functional courses for officers and enlisted personnel from the Malaysian 
Army. Besides that, one of the primary emic data was collected at an officers’ mess which 
functions as a social setting for commissioned officers to dine and socialise. The primary 
emic data was collected from the interactions among commissioned officers and enlisted 
personnel through audio recordings. It consists of 3 different interactions which were 
recorded from different settings.  
 Chua (2016) proposed that voluntary participation is important for researchers to 
understand and the informants should not be forced to participate in a study. Therefore, this 
allows the informants to freely decide to participate or otherwise. The commissioned officers 
and enlisted personnel were briefed on the purpose of this study and were also assured on the 
confidentiality of this study. Hence, the researcher prepared letters of agreement for the 
informants and also guarantee forms for both parties to acknowledge. The researcher 
provided information about this study in the letters of agreement to his informants. The 
information about this research gave an overview of this research and allowed the informants 
to decide in participating or declining. They each signed a letter of agreement as an 
acknowledgement to become research informants. The researcher adhered to research ethics 
of guarding the privacy of the informants in this research by erasing the identity and names of 
the informants (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Therefore, their names were kept 
anonymous and the researcher assigned the informants with their ranks and subsequently, the 
first alphabet of their names or a designation for their appointment in the military. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
This research focuses on the power structures and how they influence the patterns of 
interaction found in the military which are used by its members with specific reference to 
commissioned officers and enlisted personnel in the Malaysian Army. In an organisation like 
the military, the power structures exist and permeate through the authority granted upon 
commissioned officers who are typically superiors over their subordinate enlisted personnel. 
Therefore, the power structures within the military exist through institutionalised power 
(Hobbes, 1962) and power by politics (Machiavelli, 1962) with the variation of ranks and 
level of hierarchy for its members.  
 The central question examined in this study focuses on analysing the patterns of 
interaction used by both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. Besides that, the 
researcher sought for answers on how does the existing power structures in the military 
influence the patterns of interaction used by both groups of its members. With the notions of 
the distinct hierarchical structure, the researcher recorded three different interactions among 
commissioned officers and enlisted personnel from different settings. Through the power 
laden expressions used in those interactions, the audio recordings were then transcribed to 
identify obvious and subtle features linked to both institutionalised power and power by 
politics. The observation made by the researcher as a participant observer played a vital role 
in the triangulation of data.  
 The very first interaction was recorded during a meet up between a Senior Instructor 
(SI, hereafter) who is a Major by rank and a total of 69 course participants (CPs, hereafter) 
who consisted of enlisted personnel from the ranks of Warrant Officer Class 2, Staff 
Sergeant, Sergeant and Corporal. The duration of the recorded meet up was 6 minutes. The 
second interaction was recorded during a meeting which involved 113 commissioned officers 
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for the nomination of the officers’ mess committee members. The meeting was chaired by the 
outgoing President of Mess Committee (PMC) who is a Lieutenant Colonel; initiated the 
nomination process for a new team of committee members. The duration of the recorded 
meeting was 25 minutes. The third interaction was recorded during a drill training session 
among enlisted personnel at a parade square. It involved 4 drill instructors and 70 CPs; 
undergoing their career course. The 4 drill instructors are Warrant Officer Class 2 by ranks; 
assigned to undertake the drill training session for the CPs who are Corporals by their ranks. 
The duration of the recorded drill training session was 54 minutes. 
 The audio data from the interactions were transcribed using Microsoft Word 2016 and 
minimal grammatical errors were corrected as the corrections did not alter the meaning of the 
information. The researcher used the transcription conventions which are based on the works 
of Schiffrin (1994) and Gail Jefferson presented in Wray, Trott & Bloomer (1998). Besides 
that, the audio data from 3 interactions spoken in the dominant Malay language with certain 
parts in English were transcribed in the both Malay and English to ease the process of gaining 
the very best from the interactions. Subsequently, the interaction transcripts were translated 
from the Malay language to English by a certified translator from the Malaysian Institute of 
Translation and Books (ITBM). 
 The first step of the data analysis involved the transcription of the audio recordings. 
The transcripts were then thematically analysed to identify the emerging features and the 
steps were divided into two different levels of coding. The first-level coding involved a 
sequenced process; identification of words, phrases, sentences in the transcripts which are 
driven by power, subsequently placing them into their respective categories (institutionalised 
power or power by politics) and assigning codes to those categories. The descriptors and 
coding scheme of the first-level coding are as shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptors and Coding Scheme of First-Level Coding (Khoo, 2019) 
 
No Forms of Power Descriptors Examples Codes 
1. Institutionalised 
Power 
1. Used to make critical decisions, deliver a 
command, order or instruction. 
2. Used to get things done, enforce certain 
practices, enforce obedience, punish and ease 
the decision making process (Neustupny, 
2002; Hoffmann et al, 2017). 
3. Used for the maintenance of the clear lines 
of authority and regulation of the chain of 
command. 
1. If you dishonour our 
agreement, I will revoke 
them. Can we agree? 
2. We are in the Army, we 
have our system, am I 
right? 
IP 
2. Power by 
Politics 
1. Used to create the beliefs for the own 
usage of those who are in power. 
2. Used by those who are in power to 
influence subordinates based on the sphere of 
influence. 
1. But we as humans, we 
will always be forgetful. 
2. When I was a student, I 
would follow the rules as a 
student. 
PP 
  
 After the obvious and subtle features of power wielding were identified, the 
transcriptions of audio recordings were analysed through the communication network found 
in those interactions. Based on the transcriptions, the communication networks in those 
interactions which are linked to both institutionalised power and power by politics were 
identified. The communication networks include downward (superiors to subordinates), 
upward (subordinates to superiors) and horizontal communication (lateral level with same 
authority) (Redding & Sanborn, 1964; Zelko & Dance, 1965).  
 The second-level coding focused on the relationship between the emerging features. It 
involved a more extensive form of coding and was meant to analyse the underlying ideas 
shown in the transcripts. Based on the emerging features, the codes which were assigned 
from the first-level coding were grouped into two separate clusters for analysis. The first 
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cluster collectively explained the raison d’etre of the interaction involved as the military is a 
highly structured organisation which places its control through power exercised on its 
members and its members embracing strict hierarchies. The second cluster focused on the 
analysis of the implicit fundamentals in the data; evident only on thorough analysis. Through 
the conversations which took place, the researcher was able to understand how power is 
being applied, exercised and conveyed through a variety of means. The interactions were 
analysed based on words, orders and instructions which were coercive in nature. Apart from 
that, the researcher also identified utterances using the regulated form of institutionalised 
power with less coercion as both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel are well 
versed with the chain of command in the military. Lastly, the identification of power 
exercised in subtle manners was identified in the interactions among commissioned officers 
and enlisted personnel. The descriptors and coding scheme of the second-level coding are as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. Descriptors and Coding Scheme of Second-Level Coding (Khoo, 2019) 
 
No Patterns of 
Interaction 
Descriptors Examples Codes 
1. Coercive 1. Used to make critical decisions, deliver a 
command, order or instruction. 
2. Used coercion or threats to convey intentions. 
3. Used to get things done, enforce certain 
practices, enforce obedience, punish and ease the 
decision making process (Neustupny, 2002; 
Hoffmann et al, 2017). 
1. If you dishonour our 
agreement, I will revoke 
them. Can we agree? 
2. Officially today, all of 
you, will be under my 
control, okay? 
 
C 
2. Regulated 1. Used for the maintenance of the clear lines of 
authority and regulation of the chain of command. 
2. Used for the maintenance of the chain of 
command in the daily routines, norms and 
practices. 
1. We are in the Army, we 
have our system, am I 
right? 
2. So, once you are here, 
portray the best. Follow the 
seniority. 
R 
3. Subtle 1. Used to create the beliefs for the own usage of 
those who are in power. 
2. Used by those who are in power to influence 
subordinates based on the sphere of influence. 
1. But we as humans, we 
will always be forgetful. 
2. When I was a student, I 
would follow the rules as a 
student. 
S 
 
ANALYSIS OF STAGES IN THE PATTERNS OF INTERACTION 
 
The researcher was able to isolate the emerging themes into three different stages namely; 
coercive, regulated and subtle. As the interactions were transcribed in addition to the second-
level of coding, the researcher identified all the words and phrases uttered by commissioned 
officers and enlisted personnel which were power laden. The researcher placed both the 
coercive and regulated stages in the patterns of interaction based on the institutionalised 
power seen in the military. Subsequently, the researcher identified words and phrases which 
are regulatory in nature based on the military’s chain of command. At the third stage of the 
patterns of interaction, the researcher placed subtle, non-institutional words and phrases, 
looked into those emerging themes with the removal of the legislator and replaced the role of 
the legislator with the metaphorical form of power through strategy (Machiavelli 1958). 
Based on the stages in the patterns of interaction, the researcher was able to determine the 
findings from the primary emic data.  
 
PEER DEBRIEFERS 
 
A qualitative research like this required a neutral set of opinions and thoughts in order to 
review and solidify its methodology and findings. Researchers in the past have provided their 
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suggestions to utilise peer debriefing as a technique in order to refine the findings of a 
qualitative research (Creswell 1994; Creswell & Miller 2000). Therefore, the concept of peer 
debriefing is encouraged as a method to increase the credibility of a qualitative research 
(Barber & Walczak 2009). 
 Each and every qualitative research will vary with its different research designs and 
scopes. Therefore, guidance is deemed vital to improve credibility of a qualitative research 
(Spall 1998). The researcher’s role in this study is very important in the methodology and 
analysis of findings from the primary set and secondary set of emic data as well as the etic 
data. Therefore, reflexivity is fundamental as the critical reflection of the knowledge 
constructed from the research which involved the planning, execution and writing of the 
research (Guillemin & Gillam 2004). Guillemin and Gillam extended their views that 
reflexivity allows the quality and validity of the research to be improved; leading towards a 
more rigorous research with the recognition of the limitations. 
 Hence, the researcher took the initiative to improve the trustworthiness and credibility 
of this study by seeking a valuable second opinion from Brigadier General Dr. A. Endry 
Nixon who is the Commandant of the Army Senior Officers’ Institute. Spall (1998) expressed 
that the relationship between the researcher and peer debriefer should be based on trust, 
honesty and communication. In the case of this research, the peer debriefer himself provided 
constructive criticism on the problem statement of this study as a form of feedback to 
improve the writing process. The researcher sought after his insights pertaining to the 
research design, data collection and data analysis to provide a different perspective as well as 
a critique for the work of the researcher. 
 Apart from that, the researcher also obtained valuable feedback from Major General 
Dato’ Tengku Ahmad Noor bin Tuan Chik, the General Officer Commanding of TRADOC 
who has served in the Malaysian Army for 40 years. The researcher bolstered his theories 
which were gained from the feedback and support from both the esteemed individuals in their 
fields of expertise. 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
The discussions would be focusing on the patterns of interactions used by commissioned 
officers and enlisted personnel. 
 
INSTITUTIONALISED POWER 
 
The first interaction was focused on the SI who reminded the CPs of the rules of the training 
centre which have to be adhered. The SI also instilled the institutional setting of the military 
by reminding the CPs in a very firm manner.  
 
74  SI: We will cooperate throughout this six weeks, give your cooperation to me  
75  gentlemen. Do not give me problems, if you give me problems, I will be  
76  problematic. If I become problematic, wait. Okay, they know how I am when I am  
77  problematic. Wohh, you are in trouble. Is that understood? (IP-C) 
78  CPs: Understood Sir! (IP-R) 
 
 Coercion was identified from Lines 74 to 78 in the transcript. The researcher was 
intrigued when the SI used absolute coercion as a warning to all CPs to cooperate with him 
throughout the six week’s course duration. There were continuous warnings spoken off by the 
SI to the CPs such as, “Do not give me problems, if you give me problems, I will be 
problematic. If I become problematic, wait. Okay, they know how I am when I am 
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problematic. Wohh, you are in trouble.” Those were all the means taken by the SI as a 
legitimate way to enforce obedience. In the bedrock of institutionalised power, the SI drawn 
legitimate power based on his rank within the social context of the military. With that, he has 
the rights to request and demand compliance from the CPs who are his subordinates (Tran, 
2007). Hence, members of the military are expected to show compliance and respect towards 
their superiors (Martins & Lopes, 2012). 
 The second interaction of the primary emic data involved members of the officers’ 
mess who are commissioned officers. The meeting was chaired by the outgoing PMC who is 
a Lieutenant Colonel. He initiated the process of nominating a new team of committee 
members. The General Officer Commanding (GOC, hereafter) who is a Major General 
intervened in the nomination process as the outgoing PMC could not ethically manage the 
nomination. Some of the identified features are as shown from Lines 32 to 43: 
 
32       GOC: Ha? Am I right? Let me talk on the reality gentlemen as a superior commander (IP-C) 
33 because I want to make things right. (C) If not, our selection is just a clown selection  
34 but you do not know all the individuals. Am I right? (IP-R) 
35       MBS: That’s right. (R) 
36       GOC: Am I right or wrong? (R) 
37       MBS: That’s right. (R) 
38       GOC: Therefore, I am using my authority which I possess as a Commander. (C) Okay, uhm:  
39 I know sometimes it goes against the constitution. That’s okay but what I mean is  
40 that when sometimes you go against what you’ve been taught to make things  
41 right. (C) If not, there were many times which I have seen this happening. Okay, first,  
42 uhm: my PMC is Dato’ P. (R) 
43       MBS: ((Members clapping)) 
 
 The identified features concur that the hierarchy of the military displays its 
organisational status which is revealed through language. Individuals in the top echelon wield 
more power through their language (Morand, 2000). As indicated in the transcript, the GOC 
posed questions to the other members of the mess to illicit their responses; indirectly 
demanding their compliance after he reinforced his position as a superior commander. In 
many ways, the GOC regulated the chain of command in the military based on the rank 
system. The GOC stepped in as he felt that the members of the mess may start nominating 
members whom they do not actually know. Hence, as the superior commander; the GOC 
coercively overrode the norms of the nomination process and justified to the members of the 
mess. A commander like the GOC considered many other factors before coming to a decision 
and that decision is final once the order is issued (Halvorson, 2010).  
 
322     AC: Is that okay if we have two names Dato’? 
323     GOC: That’s okay, b- but, but when we call for a meeting to seek for = (IP-R) 
324     AC: = The individual is there. (R) 
325     GOC: Uhm, he must be there. Understood? I don’t care. (IP-C) (3.5) Okay. 
 
 Coercion was also identified from Lines 323 to 325 in the transcript. The researcher 
was once again intrigued when the GOC used absolute coercion to answer a question posed 
by the Acting Commandant of a training centre on the nomination of a committee member 
who holds two appointments. Strong phrases such as, “he must be there. Understood? I don’t 
care” were used by the GOC as a legitimate way to demand compliance. Based on his 
institutionalised status of authority, the GOC has the rights to request and demand 
compliance from the nominated mess committee member who is his subordinate officer 
(Tran, 2007). Hence, it is generally agreed that military culture restricts its members’ freedom 
of action and their rights are considered secondary to the needs of the military and the nation 
(Janowitz, 1959). 
3L: The Southeast Asian Journal of English Language Studies – Vol 25(3): 46 – 64 
http://doi.org/10.17576/3L-2019-2503-04 
56 
	  
 The third interaction of the primary emic data involved drill instructors who are 
facilitating a drill training session among enlisted personnel. Some of the identified features 
are as shown from Lines 19 to 21: 
 
19       CP 2: Immediately on the command, three ranks in front of me, three ranks move. 
20       D1 1: Woi what is wrong with you Corporal? Your words of command are wrong! (IP-C) 
21       CP 2: Squad, pay attention this way. 
  
 The researcher identified coercion which was used by Drill Instructor 1 (DI 1) when 
Course Participant 2 (CP 2) called out the wrong words of command. CP 2 was drilling his 
own squad mates in his syndicate. He failed to properly deliver his drill command which 
resulted in him being verbally criticised in a stern manner by DI 1. DI 1 applied coercion to 
ensure that CP 2 can properly deliver his words of command. Hence, discipline was instilled 
on the parade square. Although DI 1 is a Warrant Officer Class 2 by rank and not a 
commissioned officer, DI 1 holds a higher rank and appointment as compared to CP 2 who is 
a Corporal by rank. As the researcher mentioned earlier, strict rank hierarchies are embraced 
by members of the military. The military is known as a highly structured organisation which 
places its control through power exercised on its members (Janowitz, 1959; Collins, 1998). 
 
POWER BY POLITICS 
 
Based on the first interaction, the researcher also identified words, phrases and sentences 
which are driven by power by politics from Lines 29 to 33. Ten of the CPs initially requested 
for the SI’s permission to stay at their homes due to the close vicinity of their homes to the 
camp. Then, the SI granted his permission with a strict reminder for them to be involved in 
all the daily scheduled activities. He also coercively affirmed that he will not hesitate to 
revoke the privilege granted if any of the ten CPs dishonours that agreement.  
 
29 SI: example from the disciplinary aspect, punctuality of time. There are ten of you  
30  who requested for my permission to stay outside the camp as your houses are  
31  nearby am I correct? (PP-S)   
32  CPs: Yes Sir! 
33  SI: I grant permission for those involved to stay outside but with requirements, all (S) 
 
 Despite being firm, the SI expressed to the CPs that he is considerate towards their 
welfare matters. Although he is in the position of the institutionalised power holder, the SI 
knew that coercion is not enough to attain and maintain his authority. Machiavelli (1950) 
explained that the balance of force and consent is essential for the dominant class to achieve 
an everlasting rule. Hence, the SI exercised intellectual and moral leadership with consent 
and persuasion. The SI could have used his authority to restrain the CPs to stay in the camp 
but instead, he consented to their request and allowed them to stay at their homes. 
 The researcher also identified words, phrases and sentences which are driven by 
power by politics from Lines 53 to 64. The GOC was being open and asked all the senior 
officers involved to discuss among themselves instead of voting for the new mess committee 
members. 
 
53       GOC: Discuss among yourselves. (PP-S)  No need for us to vote because, it will come back to 
54 both senior officers will have to discuss now to the extent gentlemen. (S) Because 
55 you don’t know because we are here at our level as seniors we already know. (S) 
56 Because Major SR can’t.(S) Pity her,(S)looking into audit lah, many more lah.(S)I think  
57 it’s fair for us to change. (S) But uhm: we want to pass on to XXX and others. So, that  
58 one also, I do not want to vote. I do not. I want both commanders to discuss  
59 Dato’. = 
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60       DM: = Yes Dato’.   
61       GOC: Your mess is my mess, my mess is your mess my friend. (S) Haaa, that’s it. All of  
62 you will be here longer, next year I will retire already. (S) That’s it. Uhm: So, uhm:  
63 we have chosen. Secretary, I want Major SH. 
64       MBS: ((Members clapping)) 
 
 As the GOC, he could continue the traditions of members from the floor nominating 
the new mess committee members. However, he exercised intellectual and moral leadership 
based on consent and persuasion. The GOC even displayed compassion when he personally 
asked for another commissioned officer from XXX (a training centre) to replace Major SR as 
the treasurer. The researcher concurs that commissioned officers like the GOC have special 
responsibility for leadership; to lawfully take moral responsibilities as his duty (Defence 
Council, 1996). 
 Lukes (1974) affirmed that the ultimate exercise of power is to ensure that other 
individuals get things done based on one’s will. Their obedience is secured through the 
control of their thoughts and desires; subjecting people to power without them knowing. 
Good communication with the other commissioned officers was the key in the case of the 
GOC permeating his philosophy of leadership and influencing his fellow officers (Hashem, 
2017). The findings from the data indicated that the GOC was open and courteous to other 
commissioned officers. He declared that the mess is shared by all as one officers’ corps; 
despite all commissioned officers are being accorded with that privilege. It can be said that 
the GOC used the combination of leadership and strategy of power as a form of influencing 
his fellow officers. 
 The researcher also identified words, phrases and sentences which are driven by 
power by politics from Lines 196 to 202 (Lines 193 to 198 for the original transcript) and 
from Lines 217 to 219 (Lines 211 to 213 for the original transcript). The newly appointed 
PMC nominated Lieutenant Colonel O (KO) as the Meals Committee Member of the Sunset 
Officers’ Mess. The latter strategically attempted to evade the given task by reasoning with 
all the members of the mess.  
 
196     KO: Dato’ can I share something Dato’? (PP-S) 
197     PMC: Huh? 
198     KO: Because why, like those meal committee members, because if we look at the  
199  concept of uhm meals. (S) There are uhm meal committee members for XXX  
200  and meal committee members uhm uhm there is BAKAT (S) ((Armed Forces  
201  Welfare and Charity Association)) there is XXX there is Pot Caring. (S) Why not  
202  we divide for the Mess and we divide for XXX, easier right? (S) 
217     KO: If tomorrow there is a massive activity:: for instance:: what if Datin visits, phase  
218  two or Annex. (S) So, I can see all of them do not bother. (S) Therefore, two activities  
219  run concurrently. (S) 
 
 KO tried to explain that he has to look into food and beverages as he is the Meals 
Committee Member for XXX, Meals Committee Member for the Armed Forces Welfare and 
Charity Association and Pot Caring. He even suggested to divide the task for both the 
Officers’ Mess and XXX and reasoned with the members of the mess with other possible 
concurrent activities. The other members were puzzled as they doubted KO. They were 
astonished and questioned over the avoidance of the assigned role to KO. As commissioned 
officers are accorded with the shared prestige and elite status in the officers’ corps, KO 
strategically interacted with the GOC, PMC and members of the mess. The researcher 
identified that as the horizontal communication network. Due to the lateral nature of 
communication among commissioned officers, especially interactions which revolve around 
problem solving, KO reasoned with all the members of the mess to evade the task given 
(Redding & Sandborn, 1964). 
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 Besides that, the researcher has also identified words, phrases and sentences which are 
driven by power by politics from Lines 220 to 226 (Lines 214 to 219 for the original 
transcript) which blend in well with institutionalised power. The GOC strategically solved the 
issue by explaining to KO that he would be able to suggest on the management of food due to 
his field of expertise being a Royal Service Corps (SC) officer. The GOC explained that 
Malay Regiment personnel are not able to do so due to their different field of expertise and he 
used the phrase, “We honour la the individual, that’s it.” This concurred with the ultimate 
exercise of power as KO’s obedience was secured through the control of his thoughts and 
desires (Lukes, 1974). 
 
220     GOC: Haa:: Okay, okay okay. Or else, you only suggest when there are activities which  
221  are conducted externally from the mess. (PP-S) Nobody to tell you are SC ((Service  
222  Corps)). (IP-R) For that matter the Malay Regiment personnel are not specialised and  
223  that is not appropriate.(S)Then, the subject matter expert is already there.(R) Uhm: We  
224  honour la the individual, (S) that’s it. Because SC is meant for food management. (S) 
225  Who is from SC? You uhm tag along with that. (R) Don’t worry, your Chairman is  
226  here = (R) 
 
 However, the GOC also blended in institutionalised power along the process by 
uttering phrases such as, “Nobody to tell you are SC (Royal Service Corps)”, “Then, the 
subject matter expert is already here”, “Who is from SC? You uhm tag along with that. Don’t 
worry, your Chairman is here =”. The researcher concludes that even though the GOC 
strategically used influence through power by politics, he came to his decision based on the 
legitimacy of the chain of command. The GOC wanted to ensure that he maintained the clear 
lines of authority besides eliminating any confusion in the process of decision making 
(Halvorson, 2010). 
 
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
 
The researcher analysed the first interaction based on the communication networks. It was 
focused on the SI who reminded the course participants of the rules of the training centre 
which have to be adhered to. The SI was instilling the institutional setting of the military by 
reminding the course participants in a very firm manner. At the same time, the SI exercised 
intellectual and moral leadership with consent and persuasion (Machiavelli, 1950).  
 The patterns of interaction depicted in the first interaction were seen as the creation 
and exchange of messages. They are influenced by the nature of the military and role 
relationship based on rank (Goldhaber, 1990). Based on the existing chain of command in the 
military, the institutionalised power which lies in the authority granted upon the SI enabled 
him to make critical decisions and convey his intentions to his enlisted personnel through 
downward communication. Enlisted personnel employed the upward communication pattern 
which revolves around feedback based on the intentions by the SI. 
 Subsequently, the researcher analysed the second interaction based on the 
communication networks. The second interaction of the primary data emic data involved 
members of an officers’ mess who are commissioned officers. The meeting was meant to 
initiate the process of nominating a new team of committee members. The GOC who is a 
Major General intervened in the nomination process as the outgoing PMC could not ethically 
manage the nomination and delayed the process.  
 The GOC being the most senior commissioned officer holds the institutionalised 
status as the superior commander. Hence, he is vested with the rights to request and demand 
compliance from commissioned officers who are his subordinates (Tran, 2007). By virtue of 
the status and prestige of the officers’ corps, the GOC knew that after exercising 
institutionalised power, he has to strike the balance right between force and consent. The 
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GOC being the dominant one exercised intellectual and moral leadership with consent and 
persuasion. This is based on the position of the GOC who needs the support and active 
consent of his fellow officers; in which failing to do so, he becomes a mere feudal lord 
(Machiavelli, 1958).  
 The chain of command in the military affirms the authority granted upon the GOC 
which enables him to make critical decisions and convey his intentions to his fellow officers 
through downward communication. Commissioned officers who are subordinate to any of 
those who are superior to them employ the upward communication pattern which revolves 
around feedback based on the intentions by those who are more superior.  
 The researcher also identified the use of power by politics by KO when he was 
nominated as the Meals Committee Member of the Sunset Officers’ Mess. KO strategically 
attempted to evade the given task by reasoning with all the members of the mess and tried to 
influence the GOC, PMC and members of the mess when he interacted with them. Based on 
the findings, the researcher ascertained that KO employed the horizontal communication 
network due to the lateral nature of communication among commissioned officers. This was 
especially seen in interactions which revolve around problem solving in which KO reasoned 
with all the members of the mess to evade the given task (Redding & Sandborn, 1964).  
As shown in the third interaction, the researcher subsequently analysed the third 
interaction based on the communication networks. The third interaction of the primary emic 
data involved 4 drill instructors who facilitated the drill training session. They moved around 
to pass comments, make corrections and grant permission for the 70 course participants who 
are enlisted personnel to proceed with their next moves after completing each move correctly.  
As superiors in that context, the drill instructors are vested with institutionalised 
power over their subordinates due to the rank, position, status and responsibility as drill 
instructors which was delegated to them (Tran, 2007). As the institutionalised power holders, 
the drill instructors have the legal rights in pointing out mistakes made by course participants 
who are their subordinates; thus enforcing obedience as well. Enlisted personnel who are 
senior by rank or in the authorised position will have the ability to request and demand 
compliance from their own subordinates (Tran, 2007). The findings were all aligned towards 
the chain of command in the military which is the hierarchical execution of command 
through the superiors and subordinates’ relationship through both downward and upward 
communication networks.  
As how other organisations operate on a daily basis, the military’s organisational 
communication is contextualised into the field of decision making process with the aspects of 
downward, upward and horizontal communication (Voos, 1967). Those patterns of 
interaction in the military are derived from the creation and exchange of messages among 
members of the military. It is influenced by role relationship (rank); direction of the message, 
serial of the message and the content of the message itself as well as its own environment 
(Goldhaber, 1990).  
 
INFLUENCE OF EXISTING POWER STRUCTURES ON THE PATTERNS OF INTERACTION 
 
TABLE 3. Stages in the Patterns of Interaction (Khoo, 2019) 
 
No Raison d’etre Patterns of 
Interaction 
1. - Taking charge. 
- Maintenance of institutional status as commissioned officers. 
- Demand compliance. 
- Reinforcement of authority. 
- Enforce obedience. 
- Deter subordinates from giving problems to superiors. 
- Subject subordinates to the superior’s decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive 
More Institutional 
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1. - Preserve institutional authority. 
- Draw clear lines of authority. 
- Making a final decision. 
- Intolerance for insubordination. 
- Instiling discipline. 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercive 
2. - Regulating the routines and institution of the military. 
- Compliance of needs based on the chain of command. 
- Reinstate the chain of command based on the rank system. 
- Uphold rank seniority based on hierarchy. 
- Enforcing order. 
- Acknowledgement of institutional status. 
- Instil command. 
- Govern the set of rules in the military. 
- Necessity of order. 
 
 
 
 
Regulated 
3. - Subtle influence to secure obedience. 
- Securing the thoughts of subordinates. 
- Strategy to convince on agreeing to a decision made. 
- Win the hearts and minds of subordinates. 
- Balanced approach after initial reinforcement of authority. 
- Influencing superiors and equals when horizontal 
communication occurs. 
 
  
 
 
Subtle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More Political 
 
As shown in Table 3, the stages in the patterns of interaction were governed by the 
raison d’etre of the interaction. Those interactions were all governed by the speakers and 
their respective contexts. Nevertheless, the justification for coercive, regulated and subtle 
forms of power applied in the three interactions are summarised in the below table. At the 
same time, the flow from being more legitimate to more hegemonic is shown based on the 
direction of the arrow is pointing. The legislation of power per se in the military is exercised 
based on chain of command. Institutionalised power was applied coercively to ease the 
critical decision making process, deliver a command or order or instruction, enforce 
obedience, punish and to get things done (Neustupny, 2002; Hoffmann et al, 2017). 
 Those who hold power also use the regulated form of institutionalised power with less 
coercion as all members of the military are well versed with the chain of command in the 
military. The findings indicated that some words and phrases are not coercive but legitimate 
as they are delivered based on the institutionally bound military routines. Apart from that, 
subtle patterns of interaction are also shown when the legislator’s role in the military is 
removed and replaced by the metaphorical form of power through strategy (Machiavelli, 
1958). Those strategies are forms of ideological dominance imparted on the dominated group 
as a norm or a state of mind (Gramsci, 1971). The balance of power between institutionalised 
power and power by politics set the ideology of the military’s social order and values as 
norms; institutionalised by the legitimate authority seen in the military. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The findings portraying the patterns of interaction challenged the traditional perception of the 
military as a very autocratic organisation which only employs institutionalised power. 
Coercive, regulatory and subtle means of power were employed for various reasons based on 
the aforesaid factors.  
 The representations of institutional setting in the military and its speakers portray the 
methods used by individuals in power in using language. Based on the existing chain of 
command in the military, the institutionalised power which lies in the authority granted upon 
commissioned officers enable them to make critical decisions and convey their intentions to 
their enlisted personnel through downward communication. Enlisted personnel employ the 
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upward communication pattern which revolves around feedback based on the intentions by 
their commissioned officers.  
 Moreover, the chain of command in the military affirms the authority granted upon 
superior commanders which enable them to make critical decisions and convey their 
intentions to their fellow officers through downward communication. Commissioned officers 
who are subordinate to any of those who are superior to them employ the upward 
communication pattern which revolves around feedback based on the intentions by those who 
are more superior. Besides that, the researcher ascertained that commissioned officers 
employ the horizontal communication network due to the lateral nature of communication 
among commissioned officers. This was especially seen in interactions which revolve around 
problem solving in which KO reasoned with all the members of the mess to evade the given 
task (Redding & Sandborn, 1964). 
As superiors in that context, the drill instructors are vested with institutionalised 
power over their subordinates due to the rank, position, status and responsibility as drill 
instructors which was delegated to them (Tran, 2007). As the institutionalised power holders, 
the drill instructors have the legal rights in pointing out mistakes made by course participants 
who are their subordinates; thus enforcing obedience as well. Enlisted personnel who are 
senior by rank or in the authorised position will have the ability to request and demand 
compliance from their own subordinates (Tran, 2007). The findings were all aligned towards 
the chain of command in the military which is the hierarchical execution of command 
through the superiors and subordinates’ relationship through both downward and upward 
communication networks. 
 The findings which portrayed the patterns of interaction have challenged the 
traditional perception of the military as a very autocratic organisation which only employs 
institutionalised power. Commissioned officers like the SI employed institutionalised power 
through coercive means when he took charge, maintained his status as a commissioned 
officer, demonstrated his authority as the SI and demanded compliance from his CPs who are 
enlisted personnel. Coercion was used as a form of reinforcement for his authority and 
employed to enforce the CPs’ obedience. The GOC only used coercion when he intended to 
reinforce his position as the superior commander and maintain his institutional status amongst 
all the commissioned officers. The flaws in the nomination process for the new mess 
committee members paved the way for the GOC to override the norms of the process and 
other commissioned officers were subjected to his decision. Coercion was also used by the 
GOC to draw the clear lines of authority with KO, thus making his final decision and 
indicated his intolerance for insubordination. Apart from that, coercion was also used by 
enlisted personnel who are drill instructors to instil discipline on the parade square and 
demand compliance from their CPs who are also enlisted personnel.  
 The regulatory form of institutionalised power is being regulated as a form of 
regulating the routines and institution of the military on a daily basis. The CPs complied with 
the SI’s needs based on the social context; hence the CPs acknowledged the status of the SI 
as a commissioned officer. The chain of command was also reinstated by the SI when he 
upheld the rank seniority based on hierarchy and regulated the regimental system on a daily 
basis; hence enforcing order. The GOC indirectly demanded compliance from the other 
members of the mess by posing questions. The members of the mess then acknowledged his 
institutional status, authority and complied with his intent based on his position in the social 
context; which regulated the chain of command based on the rank system. It can be said that 
institutionalised power governs the set of rules in the military and permeates the necessity of 
order (Hobbes, 1962).  
 Besides institutionalised power, power by politics was employed by the SI through 
subtle means in order to secure the obedience of the CPs unknowingly. The CPs thoughts 
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were secured when subtleness was employed by the SI as a considerate individual towards 
the CPs’ welfare in his communicative strategies. On the other hand, the GOC used power by 
politics to subtly influence the members of the mess and secure their obedience after 
employing institutionalised power. Based on the analysis made, the GOC used power by 
politics as a strategy to convince the members of the mess on agreeing to his decision to 
override the norms of the nomination process and allowing the rest of the appointments to be 
nominated by the other senior commissioned officers as well as winning their hearts by 
demonstrating compassion. The balanced approach by the GOC is seen as a strategy taken in 
influencing his fellow officers after he reinforced his authority. 
 Apart from that, the analysis also indicated that the lateral nature of communication 
allowed KO to employ power by politics when he interacted with the GOC, President of 
Mess Committee (PMC) and members of the mess. The researcher concurs that KO took the 
advantage of the horizontal communication network to influence the members of the mess, 
although some of them are his superior officers.  
 Based on the analysis made, the patterns of interaction in the military are derived 
through various means and those are all governed by the context as well as the speakers of 
the interaction. Through movies, dramas, books and news, the society in general may have 
their views on how members of the military apply institutionalised power when they interact 
with one another (Janowitz, 1959; Collins, 1998). Ironically, those perceptions are viewed 
from one angle and the reality is far more complex as those patterns of interaction are 
dependent on many other influential factors apart from the chain of command in the military. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study shown how the existing power structures in the military influence the patterns of 
interaction used by its members. The methodology employed in this study is proven to be 
effective as it addressed how dominant groups in the higher echelon of the military derive 
their patterns of interaction through other ways besides the rank structure. The findings 
indicated that members of the military; both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel 
derive their patterns of interaction based which are coercive, regulated and subtle. Those are 
all based on the context; the situation and setting of those interactions as well as the speakers 
involved; commissioned officers or enlisted personnel or both in the same interaction. 
 There are possibilities of extending study like this to investigate conversations as an 
institution with its own specific practices, speakers and their identities as well as analysing 
the organisational practices with their constraints and context. When analysing conversations 
in organisations with hierarchy, emphasis can be placed into analysing other military service 
or uniformed services on their application of power in interactions involving both 
commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. However, an extension of this study could be 
considered to investigate the social conditioning of enlisted personnel with local cultural 
values which creates the gap and segregation between commissioned officers and enlisted 
personnel. It would be beneficial for the MAF at large and all the three branches of its 
military service to investigate the extent of local cultural values permeating in the different 
services and the impacts. 
 An area of study like this would be beneficial for the Malaysian Army. Researchers 
can look into the social conditioning of local cultural values among enlisted personnel which 
impedes the positive bonding among both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel and 
leads to segregation between the two different categories of members of the military. A 
different view could also be taken by researchers to investigate the same occurrence in the 
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other military services namely; the Royal Malaysian Navy and Royal Malaysian Air Force to 
study the extent of local cultural values permeating in the respective military services. 
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